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PRODUCTS LIABILITY- FUNCTIONALLY
IMPOSED STRICT LIABILITY
DAVID A. FISCHER*

Introduction
Many manufacturers and insurance companies claim that a products liability crisis exists.' This is evidenced by soaring products liability
insurance rates. They express the fear that as insurance becomes
unavailable or prohibitively expensive, useful products will be withheld
from the market and some manufacturers may even be forced out of
business. 2 Such critics of the tort system are calling for modifications of
the common law in order to give greater protection to manufacturers. A
more drastic approach, vigorously championed by Professor Jeffrey
O'Connell, calls for total or partial abolition of the tort system and
substitution with various forms of no-fault insurance.' In response, the
federal government recently created an Interagency Task Force on Product
Liability to study products liability and consider possible remedies to any
problems that are found.
The task force found that while there was no products liability crisis, 4
there were some serious problems. Specifically, certain targeted industries
experienced average products liability insurance increases of from 150% to
@ 1979 David A. Fischer
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1 INTERAGENCY

TASK FORCE ON PRODUCT LIABILITY, FINAL REPORT I-1 (Nov. 1, 1977)
[hereinafter cited as FINAL REPORT]; Johnson, ProductsLiability "Reform" A Hazardto Consumers, 56 N.C. L. REV. 667, 678 (1978) [hereinafter cited as Johnson].
2 FINAL REPORT, supra note 1, at I-1; Johnson, supra note 1, at 678.
3 J. O'CONNELL, ENDING INSULT TO INJURY-No-FAULT

INSURANCE FOR PRODUCTS AND

SERVICES (1975) [hereinafter cited as O'CONNELL (book)]; O'Connell, TransferringInjured Vic-

tims' Tort Rights to No-Fault Insurors: A New "Sole Remedy" Approach to Cure Liability InsuranceIlls, 1977 U. ILL. L. FORUM 749 [hereinafter cited as O'Connell article, 1977 U. ILL. L.

O'Connell, No-fault Liability by Contract for Doctors, Manufacturers, Retailers and'
Others, 1977 INS. L.J. 531; O'Connell, An Immediate Solution to Some ProductLiability Problems; Worker's Compensationas Sole Remedy for Employees, with Employer's Remedy Against
Third Party, 1976 INS. L.J. 683; Q'Connell, An Alternative to Abandoning Tort Liability: Elective No-fault Insurance for Many Kinds of Injuries, 60 MINN. L. REV. 501 (1976); O'Connell,
Elective No-fault Insurance for Many Kinds of Accidents: A Proposal and an "Economic"
Analysis, 42 TENN. L. REV. 45 (1974); O'Connell, Expanding No-fault Beyond Auto Insurance:

FORUM];

Some Proposals,59 VA. L. REV. 749 (1973) [hereinafter cited as O'Connell article, 59 VA. L. REV.].
4 Johnson, supranote 1, at 678.
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200% between 1974 and 1976.' The task force found there were three basic
causes for the problem: improper insurance rate-making practices, uncertainties in the law of products liability, and production of unsafe
products. 6
The specific problem with the tort litigation system, according to the
task force, is that the law is so unsettled in most jurisdictions that
manufacturers and insurance companies have no way of estimating potential liability.' This is a partial cause of the panicky rate-making decisions
that have taken place in the insurance industry within the last few years
Actual decisions that have been manifestly unfair to defendants are very
few in number. 9 Therefore, a major need of the system is far greater
predictability and assurance that manufacturers will not be held liable for
excessive damages.
A study of the various approaches used by courts for determining
whether to impose strict liability reveals the cause for the uncertainty in the
law. Courts have developed a number of distinct approaches, all of which
tend to be rather simplistic in that they focus on a limited range of factors.
For example, whether the danger posed by the product is latent or patent
might be determinative. The difficulty is that the law applies to such a
diverse range of cases that the existence of a chosen factor in one case
might have an entirely different significance than it would have if it were
present in another case. Thus, obviousness of the danger might provide a
reasonable basis for denying liability where precautions are available to
minimize the danger; yet obviousness might be irrelevant if no such precautions are available. This illustrates that if any given approach were literally
applied in every case, it would often yield results that are clearly
undesirable when analyzed in light of the policy considerations underlying
the imposition of strict liability. This has led some courts to switch from
one approach to another in different cases in the hope of finding a rule that
would satisfactorily resolve all cases. '0 Other courts retain flexibility by
5 Schwartz. ProposedRemedies for the American Problem: U.S. GovernmentalActivity,
29 MERCER L. REV. 437 (1978).
6 Department of Commerce, Options Paper on Product Liability and Accident Compensa-

tion Issues, 43 Fed. Reg. 14612, 14613 (1978) [hereinafter cited as Options Paperl.
7 Id. at 14513-14614, 14616.
8 Id. at 14514.
9 Id. at 14616.
10 The following chronology of cases demonstrate the difficulty the California courts have
had in finding one satisfactory rule: Greenman v. Yuba Power Prod., Inc., 59 Cal. 2d 57, 377 P.2d
897, 27 Cal. Rptr. 697 (1963) (consumer expectations test of defect); Luque v. McLean, 8 Cal. 3d
121, 501 P.2d 1163, 104 Cal. Rptr. 443 (1972) (rejecting consumer expectations test of defect);
Oakes v. Geigey Agric. Chem., 272 Cal. App. 2d 645, 77 Cal. Rptr. 709 (1969) (unreasonably
dangerous test of defect); Cronin v. J.B.E. Olson Corp., 8 Cal. 3d 121, 501 P.2d 1153, 104 Cal.
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failing to clarify exactly what test is being used." This has understandably
created great confusion among potential defendants and insurance companies because neither can accurately predict what rules will be applied in
future cases.
In light of the current pressure to reform or even abolish the tort law
system, it is necessary to consider the possible changes that might be made.
A system of strict liability is needed that will yield results which are
reasonably predictable and which advance the policies underlying strict
liability. Actually, these two goals are related because courts cannot be expected to forthrightly apply a rule that does not consistently reconcile those
policies in a satisfactory fashion. Therefore, the framework for analysis
that will be used in this article is to evaluate alternative approaches in light
of the policy considerations. Enhanced predictability of result may be
possible if a rule can be developed that will satisfactorily reconcile these
policies underlying strict liability.
Two basic policies underlie the imposition of strict liability; first is
the policy of risk spreading. It is desirable that manufacturers should
spread losses inevitably resulting from the use of their products among all
consumers by paying for those losses and then recouping the loss by raising
the price of the product enough to either purchase insurance against the
loss or to self-insure. 2 The second policy is to provide a safety incentive.
Competition provides manufacturers with an incentive to keep costs down,
and because risk spreading increases costs, an incentive is provided to
manufacture fewer defective products. 3 A countervailing consideration is
that the liability imposed on manufacturers must not be so onerous as to
unduly burden industry. For example, the objectives of risk spreading and
deterrence might be furthered by imposing liability on automobile
manufacturers for all harm caused by automobiles. However, it is clearly
not economically feasible to impose such liability because it would have a
disastrous effect on the automobile industry and on the economy as a
whole.
Rptr. 433 (1972) (rejecting unreasonably dangerous test of defect); Barker v. Lull Eng'r Co., 20
Cal. 3d 413, 573 P.2d 443, 143 Cal. Rptr. 225 (1978) (a product is defective in design if it is either
unreasonably dangerous in retrospect or if it contains dangers that a reasonable buyer would not
expect).
"1 E.g., Bataud v. Suburban Marine & Sporting Goods, Inc., 543 P.2d 209 (Alas. 1975)
(rejecting consumer expectations test of defect and unreasonably dangerous test of defect and
substituting no new definition of defect).
12 Holford, The Limits of Strict Liability for ProductDesign and Manufacture,52 TEX. L.
REV. 81, 82-84, 87-88 (1973); Keeton, ProductLiability and the Meaning of Defect, 5 ST. MARY'S
L.J. 30, 34-35 (1973); Wade, On the Nature of Strict Liabilityfor Products,44 Miss. L.J. 825, 826
(1973) [hereinafter cited as Wade].
13 Holford, supranote 12; Wade, supra note 12.
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Ideally, a scheme of strict liability should be devised which will further the policy objectives of risk spreading and deterrence in a predictable
fashion without unduly burdening industry. This article will analyze the
schemes of strict liability presently in force in light of these objectives. This
analysis will reveal serious drawbacks in the present scheme of strict liability. An alternative approach that more fully accommodates the competing
policy considerations will then be examined.
I. Common Law Strict Liabilityin Tort
Courts generally require that products be defective before those in the
business of selling such products can be held strictly liable for the harm
they produce. This requirement helps prevent manufacturers from becoming insurers for all the harm caused by their products. Courts have
developed two basic tests for determining whether a product is defective.
One test is known as the consumer expectations test. It was derived
from the law of warranty 4 and is designed to protect consumers from hidden or unexpected dangers arising from the use of products. Recovery is
precluded under this test, regardless of the magnitude of the danger
involved, if the danger is obvious, generally known, 6 or has been adequately warned against." This test grants a limited immunity to manufacturers." They are free to market dangerous products, even if the danger
can be feasibly eliminated or reduced, as long as they make the danger
known.' 9
The second test of defect is that a product is defective if it is
unreasonably dangerous. This test was also derived from the law of warranty.2" A product is defective under this test if a reasonable person would
not market it because the utility of the product is outweighed by the gravity
of harm threatened by the use of the product.2' Dean Wade has
enumerated the following list of factors to be taken into account in making
14 Barker v. Lull Eng'r Co., 20 Cal. 3d 413, 429-30, 573 P.2d 443, 454, 143 Cal. Rptr. 225,
236 (1978).
Is E.g., Maas v. Dreher, 10 Ariz. App. 520, 460 P.2d 191 (1969); Denton v. Bachtold
Brothers, Inc., 8 1I.. App. 3d 1038, 291 N.E.2d 229 (1972); Noel, Products Defective Because of
InadequateDirectionsor Warnings, 23 Sw. L.J. 256, 274 (1969).
16 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS, § 402A, comment i (1965) [hereinafter cited as
RESTATEMENT].
17 Id., comment

j.
Henderson, JudicialReview of Manufacturers' Conscious Design Choices: The Limits
ofAdjudication, 73 COLUM. L. REV. 1531, 1560(1973).
19 Id. at 1561.
20 Reitz & Seabolt, Warrantiesand Product Liability: Who Can Sue and Where?, 46 TEMP.
L.Q. 527, 530(1973).
21 See text accompanying notes 46-49, infra.
18
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the determination: the usefulness of the product; the likelihood it will
cause injury and the seriousness of the injury; the availability of safer
substitutes; the manufacturer's ability to eliminate the danger; the user's
ability to avoid the danger; the user's knowledge of the danger; and the
feasibility of risk spreading.22
A court may use either test as the exclusive test for determining defectiveness, or it may use the two tests in combination. As will be seen later,
the test used or the combination used can materially affect the results in
given cases and the scope of liability in general.
Regardless of the test used or combination used, none of the tests of
defect can consistently advance the policy considerations underlying strict
liability. Cases will often arise where strict liability is imposed even though
considerations of policy do not call for it. That is, risk spreading and deterrence cannot be meaningfully advanced by the imposition of liability or the
manufacturer cannot feasibly bear the loss. On the other hand, cases will
arise where strict liability is not imposed even though it is economically
feasible to do so, and risk spreading and deterrence can be effectively advanced. From a policy perspective, the results yielded by any of these tests
of defect will frequently be wrong.
In order to illustrate the inability of the present approach to consistently advance the policy considerations underlying strict liability, the
various tests of defect currently employed by courts will be discussed in
detail. First, the use of one test or the other as the exclusive test of defectiveness will be examined. Then, use of the two tests in various combinations will be examined.
Use of Either ConsumerExpectationsor Unreasonable
Dangeras Sole Test of Defect
Either test can be used as the sole test of defect. Thus, the
unreasonably dangerous test can be used to resolve all cases, whether they
involve manufacturing defects, improper design, or a failure to warn.23
Obviousness of the danger would still be relevant insofar as it relates to
reasonableness; however, it would not be controlling. Likewise, consumer
expectations can be used as the sole criterion for resolving all such cases.24
Selection of the test used can materially affect the result. Many cases
arise where liability would be imposed under one test, but not the other.
Wade, supranote 12, at 837-38.
Phillips v. Kimwood Mach. Co., 269 Ore. 485, 525 P.2d 1033 (1974).
24 Manufacturing defects: Maas v. Dreher, 10 Ariz. App. 520, 460 P.2d 191 (1969). Design
defects: Lunt v. Brady Mfg. Corp., 13 Ariz. App. 305, 475 P.2d 964 (1970); Morrow v.
Trailmobile, 12 Ariz. App. 578, 473 P.2d 780 (1970); Wagner v. Coronet Hotel, 10 Ariz. App.
296, 458 P.2d 390 (1969).
22
23
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For example, a punch press without a feasible safety device would be
defective under the unreasonably dangerous test because the utility of
omitting the device is greatly outweighed by the gravity of the harm
threatened to the worker who must use the machine. However, such a
machine would not be defective under the consumer expectations test
because the danger of injury by inadvertently catching one's hand in the
mechanism is readily apparent to anyone who uses the machine. The opposite result also frequently happens. Suppose a new and apparently
desirable drug is marketed containing an unknown but justified risk of a
serious side effect. Such a product would not be defective under the
unreasonably dangerous test because the utility of the drug outweighs the
gravity of harm threatened by its use. However, such a product would be
defective under the consumer expectations test because the ordinary consumer would have no way of knowing of the dangerous side effect.
ConsumerExpectations Test
From a policy perspective, the consumer expectations test often
works quite well in situations where the user's knowledge of the risk
enables him to protect himself by using the product in such a way as to
minimize the risk,25 and where the risk cannot be feasibly eliminated or
reduced.26 For example, suppose a plaintiff smashes his finger while using
the defendant's hammer. There would be no liability under the consumer
expectations test because the danger is obvious. This result is desirable.
The safety incentive policy underlying strict liability cannot be significantly
advanced because it is unlikely that any alternative design could eliminate
the danger without destroying the utility of the product. The policy of risk
spreading could be advanced by imposing liability; however, the cost of
imposing such liability on manufacturers for all such accidents would probably be too great to bear.
In other situations the consumer expectations test does not work well
from the point of view of advancing the policy considerations underlying
strict liability. This often results because consumers do not have the same
information as manufacturers and therefore their expectations as to safety
will not always be in line with reality. Inequities result when those expectations are either too high or too low, or when the consumer's knowledge of
the danger does not aid him in avoiding injury.
25 Dorsey v. Yoder Co., 331 F. Supp. 753 (E.D. Pa. 1971), aff'd, 474 F.2d 1339 (3d Cir.
1973); Keeton, ProductsLiability-Inadequacyof Information,48 TEX. L. REV. 398, 400 (1970);
James, The UntowardEffects of Cigarettesand Drugs: Some Reflections on EnterpriseLiability,
54 CALIF. L. REV. 1550, 1555 (1966).
26 Dorsey v. Yoder Co., 331 F. Supp. 758 (E.D. Pa. 1971), aff'd, 474 F.2d 1339 (3d Cir.
1973).
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The consumer expectations test does not work well when expectations
are unreasonably high, as they often are with the introduction of new products.27 Suppose a new antibiotic is introduced. Despite careful testing it
contains an unknowable risk of a serious allergic reaction in a significant
number of people. The first users to suffer the reaction would be able to
recover under strict liability in tort since their expectations were
frustrated.2 8 Liability advances the safety incentive rationale for strict
liability. The manufacturer who knows that he is held to a standard of
perfection has a greater incentive to eliminate hazards from his products
than a manufacturer who is merely required to use reasonable care.29 The
difficulty is that such liability may have too much of a deterrent effect. The
potential liability in such industries is so great that it could well unduly
discourage the development and introduction of new and useful products.
Liability also advances the risk spreading rationale underlying strict liability, at least from the consumer's perspective. However, this could create a
hardship from the manufacturer's point of view in certain cases because he
cannot plan to spread an unknown risk."0 In such cases he would be required to spread the risk by use of subsequent price increases. This may not
always be feasible, and even where it is, it might cause temporary disruptions harmful to the enterprise.
The consumer expectations test can impair achievement of the goals
underlying strict liability in other situations as well. Suppose in the antibiotic example the danger of allergic reaction becomes known after a
period of time. Since users are aware of the risk, the product is no longer
defective. 3 Users suffering allergic reactions from this time on will have no
remedy. The policy of risk spreading is completely thwarted. Likewise, all
incentive for the manufacturer to reduce or eliminate this hazard has been
eliminated. In fact, literal application of the consumer expectations test
would permit the manufacturer to continue to market the drug with the
hazard even if he could feasibly eliminate the hazard.
The consumer expectations test may afford the consumer little protection in many other situations. In certain instances the consumer's
knowledge of the risk will not aid him in avoiding or minimizing the
27 Rheingold, What Are the Consumer's "Reasonable Expectations"?,22 Bus. LAW. 589,
595 (1967).
28 Lunt v. Brady Mfg. Corp., 13 Ariz. App. 305, 475 P.2d 964 (1970); Wagner v. Coronet
Hotel, 10 Ariz. App. 296, 458 P.2d 390 (1969).
29 O'Connell, An Alternative to Abandoning Tort Liability: Elective No-fault Insurance
for Many Kinds of Injuries,60 MINN. L. REV. 501, 550 (1976).
30 Connolly, The Liability of a Manufacturer for Unknowable Hazards Inherent in His
Product,32 INs. COUNSEL J. 303, 307 (1965).
31 Note, ProductsLiability and Section 402A of the Restatement of Torts, 55 GEO. L.J.
286,318 (1966).
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danger. Suppose an accident victim is in desperate need of a blood transfusion. His knowledge that there is a one in a thousand chance that a given
pint of blood will be infected with hepatitis virus affords him no protection. He has no real choice but to agree to the transfusion, and he has no
way of detecting whether a given pint of blood is contaminated. In reality,
he is no better off than a patient who agrees to a transfusion without
knowledge that the risk exists.
An additional problem with the consumer expectations test is that it
often affords inadequate protection to bystanders. The test originated during a period when only users or consumers of products were permitted to
recover in strict liability.32 The test provides them with limited protection,
as discussed previously. Liability has now generally been extended to cover
bystanders.3 The test, however, affords them considerably less protection
because the user's awareness of the hazard remains the criteria for determining defectiveness regardless of whether the bystander is aware of the
hazard. Yet the user's knowledge of the hazard will not always provide sufficient protection for the bystander. First, the user does not have as great
an incentive to protect a bystander from the danger posed by the product
as he would to protect himself. Second, the hazard may be a condition of
the product which impairs the user's ability to protect bystanders. For example, an earthmoving machine designed so that the operator's view is
obstructed is dangerous to bystanders because of the operator's inability to
see them.34
The usefulness of the consumer expectations test in achieving the
goals underlying strict liability is obviously limited. In some cases it works
well, and in other cases it works poorly. This is because the rule does not
take into account the different fact patterns which require that cases be
dealt with differently.
In recent years a great many courts have rejected the consumer
expectations test of defect." This has normally occurred in cases where the
consumer expectations test is an especially inappropriate criterion for
determining whether to impose strict liability in view of the policy considerations involved. This typically has occurred in cases where a bystander
32

Noel, Products Defective Because of InadequateDirections or Warnings, 23 Sw. L.J.

256,274 (1969).
33 E.g., Giberson v. Ford Motor Co., 504 S.W.2d 8 (Mo. 1974).
34 Pike v. Frank G. Hough Co., 2 Cal. 3d 465, 467 P.2d 229, 85 Cal. Rptr. 629 (1970).
35 Dorsey v. Yoder Co., 331 F. Supp. 753 (E.D. Pa. 1971), aff'd, 474 F.2d 1339 (3d Cir.
1973); Rhoads v. Service Mach. Co., 329 F. Supp. 367 (E.D. Ark. 1971); Luque v. McLean, 8 Cal.
3d 136, 501 P.2d 1163, 104 Cal. Rptr. 443 (1972); Pike v. Frank G. Hough Co., 2 Cal. 3d 465, 467
P.2d 229, 85 Cal. Rptr. 629 (1970); Thompson v. Package Mach. Co., 22 Cal. App. 3d 188, 99
Cal. Rptr. 281 (1972); Brown v. Quick Mix Co., 75 Wash. 2d 833, 454 P.2d 205 (1969); Palmer v.
Massey-Ferguson, Inc., 3 Wash. App. 508, 476 P.2d 713 (1970).
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is injured by a defective product,3 6 or where an employee is required to use
an obviously dangerous machine under circumstances where he is likely to
injure himself inadvertently." In many of these cases, both the safety
incentive and risk spreading rationales are frustrated by the consumer expectations test. Risk spreading is economically feasible, and in many cases
safety devices are currently available which would greatly reduce the
hazard. Application of the consumer expectations test removes all incentive to make such products safer.
UnreasonablyDangerousTest
Deans Wade and Keeton have long advocated that the unreasonably
dangerous test be used as the sole test of defect.3 8 The consumer's
knowledge of the danger would be one factor relevant to the question of
reasonableness, 9 but it would not be conclusive. They advocate that hindsight at the time of trial, rather than foresight at the time of manufacture,
be used to determine if a product is "unreasonably dangerous." 4 That is,
the product is deemed unreasonably dangerous if a reasonable manufacturer with knowledge of the danger and feasible design alternatives that are
known as of the date of trial would not have marketed the product in the
same fashion as the defendant.4 Both adequacy of the design and of any
warning that was or should have been given are determined by this method.
From the point of view of implementing the policies underlying strict
liability, this test of defect is often unsatisfactory. It uses the single
criterion of whether a reasonable manufacturer would sell the product to
resolve all design, warning, and manufacturing defect cases. This is often
the wrong question because even if a manufacturer would sell the product
because its virtues outweigh its vices, it does not necessarily follow that risk
spreading and deterrence cannot be accomplished in a given case. For example, strict liability may well be feasible and desirable in the case of a
drug which contains a one in a million chance of serious side effect. The
manufacturer would have to raise the price of each dose by only ten cents
in order to pay damages of a hundred thousand dollars to each unfortunate
victim. Liability would provide an incentive for him to eliminate the risk of
36

E.g., Pike v. Frank G. Hough Co., 2 Cal. 3d 465, 467 P.2d 229, 85 Cal. Rptr. 629

(1970).
Rhoads v. Service Mach. Co., 329 F. Supp. 367 (E.D. Ark. 1971).
Keeton, ProductLiability and the Automobile, 9 FORUM-1 (1973) [hereinafter cited as
Keeton]; Wade, supra note 12, at 834-35.
39 Wade, supra note 12, at 837.
40 Keeton, supra note 38; Wade, supra note 12.
41 Phillips v. Kimwood Mach. Co., 269 Ore. 485, 525 P.2d 1033 (1974); Roach v.
Kononen, 269 Ore. 457, 525 P.2d 125 (1974).
37

38
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the side effect if it appeared that the cost of doing so might be less than the
cost of paying for damages caused by the drug. In the case of a drug with a
one in a thousand chance of the same side effect, risk spreading probably
would not be feasible because the manufacturer would have to raise the
price of each dose by one hundred dollars in order to pay damages of one
hundred thousand dollars to each victim. Certainly, with regard to most
drugs such a price rise would be impractical. Strict liability in such a case
would normally result in removal of the drug from the market, a result that
is clearly undesirable if the drug has great utility. The unreasonably
dangerous test of defect would resolve both cases by determining whether a
reasonable person would market these drugs by comparing the utility of
the drug with the gravity of harm threatened by its use. Assuming both
drugs have sufficient utility to warrant their use and that a proper warning
has been given, both would be deemed nondefective. From a policy
perspective this result is wrong in the first case and right in the second.
The unreasonably dangerous test of defect can err in the other direction as well. That is, it can impose liability in cases where it is not feasible
and desirable from a policy point of view. In the examples discussed above,
assume that careful testing fails to reveal the risk of the side effect before
the drugs are marketed. After discovery it is determined that the risk is
unreasonable in retrospect. Here the manufacturer is held strictly liable
even in the case where he cannot feasibly spread the risk. The possibility of
such a result can have a harmful effect on the development of new products and on insurance rates. This is because the manufacturer of a new
product cannot know whether his product contains a scientifically
unknowable risk, and if so, whether the damages caused by the risk will
bankrupt him if he is held responsible.
The test does not yield consistently correct results because it considers
too narrow a range of factors, and it looks at them from the wrong point
of view. While the utility of the product and the gravity of harm threatened
are relevant, they are not the only factors that are relevant. Furthermore,
these factors should be used, along with other factors, to determine
whether risk spreading and deterrence are feasible and desirable instead of
using them alone to determine whether the product should be marketed. It
is error to assume that strict liability should never be imposed in the case of
products that reasonably may be marketed.
Use of the Consumer Expectations Test and the
UnreasonablyDangerous Test in Combination
Frequently courts use these two tests of defect in combination rather
than singly. Courts doing so may combine the tests in two different ways,

HeinOnline -- 32 Okla. L. Rev. 102 1979

19791

STRICT LIABILITY

i.e., either in the conjunctive or in the disjunctive. That is, one court might
require that a product both violate consumer expectations and be
unreasonably dangerous in order for the defendant to be held liable. Other
courts might hold the defendant liable if the product either violates consumer expectations or is unreasonably dangerous.
Using the two tests in combination is no more satisfactory from a
policy perspective than use of the tests singly. This is illustrated in the
following two sections by analyzing the results achieved in light of the pertinent policy considerations.
The Tests in the Conjunctive
The Restatement of Torts (Second) Section 402A 42 uses the two tests
of defect in the conjunctive. That is, in order for the product to be defective, it must both be in a condition not contemplated by the ordinary consumer, and be unreasonably dangerous.4 3 As a practical matter, the
significance of adding the unreasonably dangerous requirement to the consumer expectations test varies, depending on whether the product is defective in manufacture or design.
The unreasonably dangerous requirement adds little in the case of
manufacturing defects. A manufacturing defect exists when a product is in
a condition other than that contemplated by the manufacturer, e.g., contains a physical flaw. As long as the flaw is hidden, such products are
defective under the consumer expectations test. Such products would
almost always be considered unreasonably dangerous as well. This is
because the exercise of all possible care in attempting to discover the
danger is no excuse.' Therefore, the test boils down to the question of
whether a reasonable person with knowledge of the defect would nevertheless market the flawed product. The answer would always be negative
unless the flaw is one that appears to present no serious risk of harm to
anyone.4 5 Because the Restatement approach differs so slightly from the
consumer expectations test in the case of manufacturing defects, it has the
same drawbacks as the consumer expectations test alone.
Sometimes inequities result because expectations are too low. Suppose a certain percentage of a manufacturer's tires have unduly weak spots
in the sidewalls. Eventually these weak spots develop into bulges which are
42 RESTATEMENT,

supranote 16, § 402A.

43 Id. at comment g.
44 Id. at § 402A(2)(a).
45 Dickerson, Products Liability: How Good Does a Product Have to Be? 42 IND. L.J.

301, 320 (1967); Wade, Strict Tort Liability of Manufacturers,19 Sw. L.J. 5, 14-17 (1965); Note,
ProductsLiabilityand Section 402A of the Restatement of Torts, 55 GEo. L.J. 286, 297 (1966).
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readily apparent. Continued use of the tire after the bulge becomes apparent can result in a dangerous blowout. There would be no liability
under the Restatement because the danger is obvious to the person who
uses the tire after the bulges develop. This thwarts the policy of deterrence
because the manufacturer has no incentive to improve his quality control
program. The policy of risk spreading might also be thwarted, especially
where the user's knowledge of the defect does not help him protect himself.
For example, the user might be an employee who is required to use the
vehicle equipped with the defective tires. Strict liability here is unlikely to
have a ruinous effect on the manufacturer and ought to be imposed.
Inequities to the manufacturer can result when expectations are too
high. Assume a control device used in nuclear power plants fails because of
a hidden physical flaw, and a nuclear accident results. The Restatement
would impose strict liability because expectations have been violated and
the device is unreasonably dangerous because a reasonable person with
knowledge of the defect would not have marketed the device. Although
liability might be desirable from the point of view of risk spreading and
deterrence, ii is probably not economically feasible from the point of view
of the manufacturer. The specter of liability provides a strong incentive for
the manufacturer to withhold his product from the market. Because the
development of nuclear energy is important to our economy, it is more appropriate to encourage this manufacturer to participate in the market as
long as he takes all reasonable quality control measures.
Design defects differ from manufacturing defects in that in design
cases the product is in the condition contemplated by the manufacturer.
Thus, automobiles equipped with brakes which fade when overheated and
automobiles equipped with regular glass rather than safety glass might be
deemed defective in design. The Restatement provides that such products

are not defective if certain conditions are met. First, the risk must be one
that cannot be eliminated "in the present state of human knowledge." 46
Second, marketing the product must appear justified because of its apparent utility." Third, a proper warning must be given. " A product that
' and is
meets these tests is denominated "unavoidably unsafe" 49
not defective. A car riot equipped with safety glass would fail these tests and be
deemed defective because it presents a serious hazard to users which can
feasibly be greatly reduced by use of safety glass. On the other hand, it may
not be feasible to produce a car whose brakes will not fade when
supra note 16, at comment k.
47 Id.
48 Id. at comments jand k.
49 Id. at comment k.
46 RESTATEMENT,
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overheated. If so, a car equipped with brakes that may fade is not defective
as long as a proper warning has been given because the utility of the product justifies its marketing. Such a product is deemed unavoidably unsafe
and nondefective.
In cases involving design defects, the unreasonably dangerous requirement adds something to the consumer expectations test of defect
because such a product can be nondefective even though the danger is
unexpected. The comments to the Restatement make this apparent. If an
unavoidably unsafe product is properly prepared and marketed, liability
exists only for a failure to warn." Yet the comments defining when a warning must be given extend the duty to warn only to hazards which the
manufacturer knew about or should have known about." It follows that
there can be no liability for marketing apparently useful products containing unknown dangers arising from the product's design. Such products
would normally violate consumer expectations because the consumer
would seldom have more information than the manufacturer is required to
have.
The Restatement comments discussed above make it clear that a product may not be deemed defective in design unless it violates both tests.
Consumer expectations must be disappointed because the danger is
unknown and has not been warned against. The product must also be
unreasonably dangerous because it does not qualify as an unavoidably unsafe product that may be justifiably marketed. Thus, in design cases the
Restatement imposes a bifurcated test of defect, requiring that the product
contain both an unexpected danger and an unreasonable danger in order to
be deemed defective.
Use of the two tests in the conjunctive represents a conservative approach because a product is defective only if it violates both tests. In the
case of the punch press which is marketed without a feasible safety device,
the product is not defective because there is no violation of consumer expectations. Note that if the unreasonably dangerous test alone were used,
liability would be imposed. In the case of the new and apparently desirable
drug containing an unknown but justified risk of a serious side effect, the
product is nondefective because it is not unreasonably dangerous. If the
consumer expectations test alone were used, this product would be deemed
defective because the danger it possesses is unanticipated.
The results yielded by the bifurcated Restatement test will sometimes
be inappropriate when viewed in light of the policies underlying the law of
strict liability. Because the Restatement approach is conservative, most of
50 Id.
51 Id. at comments jand h.
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the mistake; that are made will favor the manufacturer. That is, the inappropriately decided cases will be ones where strict liability was not imposed
even though it was feasible and desirable to do so. In the case of the punch
press, strict liability is economically feasible, risk spreading is desirable,
and such liability would provide a healthy incentive for the production of a
safer punch press. Yet no liability would be imposed under the
Restatement test. In the case of the experimental drug, the policies of
deterrence and risk spreading can be advanced. The desirability of strict
liability depends on whether risk spreading is feasible. This depends upon
the magnitude of harm caused by the product. If the risk of harm is sufficiently small so that the manufacturer can spread the risk by price increases, strict liability is desirable. If the magnitude of harm caused by the
drug is so great that this is not feasible, strict liability would be undesirable
because it would drive the product off the market. The Restatement would
not distinguish between these two cases and would resolve both cases in
favor of the manufacturer by determining that the product is unavoidably
unsafe. This illustrates that the Restatement will frequently exonerate the
manufacturer in the cases where strict liability is feasible and desirable
when considered in light of the appropriate policy considerations.
A difference of opinion exists as to whether foresight or hindsight is
used to determine if a product is unreasonably dangerous because of the
way it was designed or because of the failure to give an appropriate warning. This issue is frequently raised by asking whether compliance with the
state of the art that existed at the time of manufacture will excuse the
maker of the product, even though subsequent improvements in
technology now permit the product to be made in a safer manner. Some
authors and courts interpret the Restatement to require that foresight at
the time of manufacture be used to determine whether a product is
unreasonably dangerous. Under this interpretation strict liability is limited
to dangerous manufacturing flaws that violate consumer expectations. In
design cases the Restatement imposes liability only if the design creates an
unexpected danger and the manufacturer either negligently adopted52 the
52 Balido v. Improved Machinery, Inc., 29 Cal. App. 3d 633, 105 Cal. Rptr. 890 (1973);
Jones v. Hutchinson Mfg., Inc., 502 S.W.2d 66 (Ky. App. 1973); W. PROSSER, TORTS 644, 659
(4th ed. 1971) [hereinafter cited as PROSSER]; L. FRUMER & M. FRIEDMAN, PRODUCTS LIABILITY, §
16Alf], [i]; 3 Id., § 33.0214], p. 328; Polelle, The Foreseeability Concept and Strict Products
Liability: The Odd Couple of Tort Law, 8 RUT. CAM. L. J. 101, 110-11 (1976); Powell & Hill,
Proofof Defect or Defectiveness, 5 U. BALT. L. REv. 77, 81, 100 (1975); Kissel, Defenses to Strict
Liability, 60 ILL. B.J. 450, 461-64 (1972); Katz, The Function of Tort Liability in Technology
Assessment, 38 U. CIN. L. REv. 587, 632 (1969); Note, Torts-Strict Liability-Automobile
Manufacturer Liable for Defective Design That EnhancedInjury After InitialAccident, 24 VAND.
L. REv. 862, 866 n.37 (1971); Note, ProductsLiability and Section 402A of the Restatement of
Torts, 55 GEo. L.J. 286, 303, 317-18 (1966); Comment, Reasonable ProductSafety: Giving Con-
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design or negligently failed to warn against the harm. 3 Under the law of
negligence a manufacturer is held to the standard of an expert in the field
and is required to keep up with scientific advances. 4 Therefore, ignorance
of the risk would provide an excuse only in the case of a risk that was scientifically unknowable at the time of manufacture. 5 This view is consistent
with much of the law of products liability as of the date the Restatement
was adopted. 6 It is also consistent with the language of the comments to
the Restatement discussed above, and with the view of Dean Prosser who
was the reporter for the Restatement at the time that Section 402A was
adopted." This approach has been applied by courts both in cases involving drugs58 and in cases involving other products. 9
The other view of the Restatement 60 is to use the Wade/Keeton hindsight test to determine if a product is "unreasonably dangerous." A product is considered unreasonably dangerous if a reasonable manufacturer
with knowledge of the danger and feasible design alternatives that are
known as of the date of trial would not have marketed the product in the
same fashion as the defendant. Both adequacy of the design and of any
tent to the DefectivenessStandardin CaliforniaStrict ProductsLiability Cases, 10 U.S. F. L. REV.
492, 506-507 (1976). See also Boisfontaine, ProductsLiability-An Overview, 20 LA. B.J. 269,
271 (1973).
53 Borel v. Fibreboard Paper Prod. Corp., 493 F.2d 1076 (5th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 419
U.S. 869 (1974); Davis v. Wyeth Laboratories, Inc., 399 F.2d 121 (9th Cir. 1968); Oakes v. E.I.
DuPont De Nemours & Co., 272 Cal. App. 2d 645, 77 Cal. Rptr. 709 (1969); PROSSER, supra note
52, at 644, 646, 659; Kissel, supra note 52, at 462-64; Note, 55 GEO. L.J., supra note 52, at 317-18;
Symposium- The State of the Art Defense in Strict ProductsLiability,56 MARQ. L. REV. 649, 658
(1974); Comment, 10 U.S.F.L. REV., supranote 52, at 506-507.
54 Ross v. Philip Morris & Co., 328 F.2d 3 (8th Cir. 1964); Marsh Wood Products Co. v.
Babcock & Wilcox Co., 207 Wis. 209, 240 N.W. 392 (1932); FINAL REPORT, supra note 1, at 11-810.
55 FINAL REPORT, supranote 1, at 11-8-9.
56 Ross v. Philip Morris & Co., 328 F.2d 3 (8th Cir. 1964); Hays v. Western Auto Supply
Co., 405 S.W.2d 877 (Mo. 1966). But see Green v. American Tobacco Co., 154 So. 2d 169 (Fla.
1963).
57 PROSSER, supranote 52, at 644-45, 646, 659 nn.72-73, 661.
58 Davis v. Wyeth Laboratories, Inc., 399 F.2d 121 (9th Cir. 1968); Christofferson v.
Kaiser Foundation Hospitals, 15 Cal. App. 3d 75, 92 Cal. Rptr. 825 (1971); Cunningham v.
Charles Pfizer & Co., Inc., 532 P.2d 1377 (Okla. 1975); Twerski, From Defect to Cause to ComparativeFault- Rethinking Some Product Liability Concepts, 60 MARQ. L. REV. 297, 317 (1977);
Comment, The Diminishing Role of Negligence in Manufacturers' Liability for Unavoidably UnsafeDrugs and Cosmetics, 9 ST. MARY'S L.J. 102 (1977).
59 Melia v. Ford Motor Co., 534 F.2d 795 (8th Cir. 1976) (Nebraska law), noted in 56 NEB.
L. REV. 422 (1977); Karjala v. Johns-Manville Prod. Corp., 523 F.2d 155 (8th Cir. 1975) (Minnesota law); Borel v. Fibreboard Paper Prod. Corp., 493 F.2d 1076 (5th Cir. 1973), cert. denied,
419 U.S. 869 (1974); Jones v. Hittle Service, Inc., 219 Kan. 627, 549 P.2d 1383 (1976); Jones v.
Hutchinson Mfg. Co., 502 S.W.2d 66 (Ky. App. 1973), discussed in Comment, ProductsLiability:
Is Section 402A Strict LiabilityReally Strict in Kentucky?, 62 Ky. L.J. 866 (1974).
60 E.g., Hamilton v. Hardy, 549 P.2d 1099 (Colo. App. 1976).
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warning that was or should have been given are determined by this method.
A conceptual advantage results from incorporating the Wade/Keeton
test into the Restatement approach. True strict liability would then be imposed in all cases because foreseeability is completely eliminated from the
determination. A manufacturer can be held liable for harm resulting from
a product that is considered defective in light of today's technology, even
though it was produced at a time when the state of the art did not permit a
safer product to be made. The other interpretation of the Restatement involves an awkward contradiction in terms. That is, a product is defective,
and thus strict liability is imposed, in design or warning cases only if the
manufacturer has been negligent in adopting the design or giving the warning. The Wade/Keeton test avoids this contradiction by truly imposing
strict liability in all cases.
The Wade/Keeton test is becoming increasingly popular with other
legal scholars" and has been accepted by a number of courts.62 Most of
these cases have not involved the scientifically unknown risk. As discussed
above, it is only in cases involving such risks that there is a real difference
between negligence liability and strict liability. The Final Report of the Interagency Task Force on Product Liability concluded that when actually
faced with this question most courts have refused to impute knowledge of
unknowable risks to manufacturers in either design63 or warning64 cases. It
remains to be seen whether courts will actually do so in the future.
Use of hindsight in determining whether a product is unreasonably
dangerous under the Restatement approach will result in virtually the same
liability as if consumer expectations were used as the sole test of defect.
Under the Restatement two-part test, a consumer injured by a product
containing a known hazard could not recover because consumer expectations would riot have been violated. Whenever a consumer is injured by a
product containing an unknown hazard that has not been warned against,
the manufaci:urer will be held liable because consumer expectations are
violated and the product is also unreasonably dangerous in one of three
ways. First, if the harm resulted from a dangerous manufacturing defect,
the product would be unreasonably dangerous because a reasonable person
with knowledge of the defect would not market the product. Second, if the
hazard resulted from the design of the product it would be unreasonably
61 Phillips, The Standardfor Determining Defectiveness in Products Liability, 46 U. CIN.
L. REV. 101, 103, 115-16 (1977); Montgomery & Owen, Reflections on the Theory and Administration of Strict Tort Liabilityfor Defective Products,27 S.C. L. REV. 803, 829 (1976); Comment, 10 U.S.F. L. REv., supranote 52, at 492.
62 E.g., Phillips v. Kimwood Mach. Co., 269 Ore. 485, 525 P.2d 1033 (1974); Roach v.
Kononen, 269 Ore. 457, 525 P.2d 125 (1974).
63 FINAL REPORT, supra note 1, at 11-8-9.
64 Id. at 1-13-15.
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dangerous if the design were deemed unreasonable in retrospect. Third, in
such a case, even if the design is reasonable, liability always would be imposed for failure to warn. A warning is always required unless it is unnecessary because the danger is known.65 Justifiable ignorance of the risk is
no excuse for failure to warn when hindsight is used. The unreasonably
dangerous test adds little to the consumer expectations test of defect when
hindsight rather than foresight is used. It would make a difference only in
the unusual case where a reasonable person would market the product notwithstanding the hidden defect because it poses no risk or a very slight risk
that reasonably can be ignored.
When analyzed from a policy point of view, the results achieved by
this approach are essentially the same as when the consumer expectations
test is used as the sole test of defect. These results are described earlier in
the section on the consumer expectations test.
The Tests in the Disjunctive
A number of courts define a product as being defective if it is either
unreasonably dangerous under the Wade/Keeton test or if it possesses hidden or unexpected dangers.66 California's recent adoption67 of this approach will undoubtedly create an impetus for other jurisdictions to follow
suit.
Use of the tests in the disjunctive rather than in the conjunctive
substantially increase the likelihood of finding that a product is defective.
This is because the victim can recover either if the danger was unexpected
or if in retrospect the danger is unreasonable. In the case of the punch press
marketed without a feasible safety guard, liability is imposed because the
product presents an unreasonable danger. In the case of the new antibiotic
drug which contains a scientifically unknowable risk of causing an allergic
reaction, liability is imposed because the drug presents an unexpected
danger. Once the danger becomes generally known or has been warned
against, it still is defective if the danger is found to be unreasonable when
the utility of the product is compared to the gravity of harm threatened.
Only if the danger is a reasonable one in retrospect is the product
nondefective.
While using the two tests in the disjunctive rather than in the conjunctive provides for recovery in a greater number of cases, this approach does
not necessarily do a better job of fulfilling the policies underlying strict
65 RESTATEMENT, supranote 16, comment j.
66 E.g., General Motors Corp. v. Hopkins, 548

S.W.2d 344 (Tex. 1977); Montgomery &

Owen, supra note 61, at 843-45.
67

Barker v. Lull Eng'r Co., 20 Cal. 3d 413, 573 P.2d 443, 143 Cal. Rptr. 225 (1978).
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liability. The difference is that most of the policy mistakes will be made in
favor of consumers and against manufacturers. Such mistakes occur when
liability is imposed even though it is not economically feasible for the
manufacturer to bear the loss, or when the policies of risk spreading and
deterrence cannot be meaningfully advanced. In the case of the antibiotic
which creates the risk of causing an allergic reaction, liability would be imposed for the initial injuries because consumer expectations were violated.
This is true even though this unexpected loss might be too large for the
manufacturer to bear. This is undesirable because it is unfair to the defendant and also because it tends to discourage other manufacturers from introducing new products which are apparently desirable. Many new products potentially possess serious unknowable risks, and manufacturers
may sometimes be unwilling to take the gamble.
Some cases will arise where the policy mistake is made in favor of the
manufacturer rather than the consumer. Referring once again to the antibiotic example, once the danger became known, the product would be
nondefective if we assume that it was not unreasonably dangerous in
retrospect. This is true even though risk spreading might be economically
feasible and might provide an incentive for development of a safer product. The difficulty with this approach is that it is another attempt to
develop a single word formula to resolve all cases mechanically.
II. ProposedStatutory Reforms
Many legislatures are considering modifications of the common law
of products liability. The Department of Commerce has recommended that
a products liability law be drafted either for implementation by the states
or by the federal government.6 8 It recommends that the law deal with such
issues as the basic standard of responsibility, statute of limitations, responsibility for unavoidably unsafe products and relevance of the state of the
art evidence, relevance of compliance with legislative or administrative
standards, various matters concerning damages recoverable, contribution
and indemnity, and rules relating to conduct on the part of product users.69
This covers the full range of issues that are raised from time to time in
various legislatures. According to the Commerce Department, the virtue of
this approach is that it would lend greater predictability to the law of products liability.70
The problem with this method of reforming the law is that it is an attempt to adopt rigid black letter rules to resolve all cases. One of the
68 Options Paper, supranote 6, at 14624.
69 Id. at 14627.
70 Id. at 14624.
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schemes for determining defectiveness discussed previously would be
frozen into the law and used to resolve all future cases. As has been
demonstrated earlier, no single rule can consistently advance the policies
underlying strict liability.
III. No-FaultInsurance
Professor Jeffrey O'Connell has advanced four no-fault insurance
proposals as complete or partial substitutes for common law strict liability.
The first is elective no-fault insurance.7 ' Under this proposal enterprises
are permitted to elect to pay for product related injuries on a no-fault
basis. The election can be as broad or narrow as desired with regard to the
type of accidents covered and the benefits available. No-fault insurance
provides the exclusive remedy for accidents coming within the scope of the
election. The common law remedy remains available for other accidents.
His second proposal is to make worker's compensation the sole
remedy for workers injured by defective products." The employer paying
benefits for an accident would have a negligence action against any third
party who negligently caused harm to the employee. Employers would use
the proceeds from such actions to help finance the system. A variant of this
proposal is to expand coverage to include all off-the-job accidents involving workers and members of their families. 3
The third proposal is to use first party insurance for all accidents.7 4
This is a purely elective system whereby potential accident victims purchase
accident insurance. Part of the consideration for guaranteed no-fault
payments is assignment of the victim's tort claim against potential product
liability defendants.
The fourth proposal is called "enterprise liability." 5 Businesses
would be liable on a no-fault basis for all risks systematically generated by
their activities. This is Professor O'Connell's most far-reaching proposal.
He views his other proposals as interim measures which will ultimately lead
to enterprise liability.
Although these no-fault schemes vary in scope and method of implementation, they share a number of common features. First, they make it
easier to recover by requiring payment on a no-fault basis and by
eliminating contributory negligence as a defense. 76 Second, they use a
supranote 3, at 97.
O'Connell article, 1977 U. ILL. L. FORUM, supra note 3.
73 Id. at 775.
71 O'CONNELL (book),
72

74 Id. at 790.
75 O'Connell article, 59 VA. L. REV, supranote 3.
76 O'CONNELL (book), supra note 3, at 80, 121 (elective no-fault); O'Connell article, 1977
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number of methods that decrease the size of recoveries. Accident victims
cannot recover damages for pain and suffering and damages that have
been paid from collateral sources." These rules will effectively bar
recovery for many small claims." In addition, most plans place upper
limits on the amounts recoverable in the case of large claims." The intended
effect of these features is to increase the number of people who can recover
damages and to reduce the total amount of damages paid on behalf of
defendants.'
A major drawback of these plans is their inability to fulfill the
policies underlying strict liability as well as the present system. Because the
purpose of each proposal is to reduce the amount of compensation paid, it
is obvious that risk spreading will be impaired because less of the risk will
be spread than previously. Deterrence will also suffer under most of these
plans. Because potential liability is smaller, manufacturers will have less
incentive to develop safer products.
This is a particular problem under elective no-fault because it permits
a potential defendant to choose in advance the types of cases where nofault will apply. The premise of the system is that he will make a specified
election only because he believes it to be in his financial self-interest.8 He is
free to elect no-fault liability in cases where he would clearly be held liable
at common law and retain the protection of the common law in cases where
he would not be liable.8" If this occurs, accident victims will have no
recovery in cases that are not actionable at common law and a reduced
recovery in cases that are actionable.
Fundamental objections would remain even if the total amount of
compensation remained the same as under the common law. The worker's
compensation and first party insurance proposals extend the philosophy
that all cases be treated alike even though they are not alike. The same
U. ILL. L. FORUM, supranote 3, at 778 (worker's compensation and first party insurance); O'Connell article, 59 Vi . L. REv., supranote 3, at 772-73 (enterprise liability).
77 0' CONNELL (book), supra note 3, at 98 (elective no-fault); O'Connell article, 1977 U.
ILL L. FORUM, supra note 3, at 774, 778 (worker's compensation and first party insurance);
O'Connell article, 59 VA. L. REV., supranote 3, at 772-73 (enterprise liability).
78 O'CONNELL (book), supranote 3, at 98.
79 O'Connell article, 59 VA. L. REV., supra note 3, at 772-74 (elective no-fault and enterprise liability); O'Connell article, 1977 ILL. L. FORUM, supra note 3, at 786 (worker's compensation and first party insurance).
80 O'CONNELL (book),

supra note 3, at 98.

81 Id. at98,99, 144, 154, 155.
82 Schwartz, Professor O'Connell's No-Fault Plan for Products and Services: Have New
Problems Been Substituted for Old?, 70 Nw. U. L. REV. 639, 646-47 (1976); Schwartz, Products
Liability and No-FaultInsurance: Can One Live Without the Other?, 12 FORUM 130, 135 (1976);
Atiwah, Book Review, 45 U. CIN. L. REV. 340, 344 (1976). Professor O'Connell apparently concedes this point, O'Connell article, 1977 ILL. L. FORUM, supra note 3, at 794.
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principles of liability are uniformly applied to all cases regardless of
whether deterrence can be meaningfully advanced and regardless of
whether risk spreading is feasible and desirable. By providing compensation in a large number of cases where it serves no useful purpose from a
policy point of view, these systems necessarily pay inadequate compensation in cases where strict liability serves a useful purpose. Because the compensation paid in such cases is relatively low, its value as a risk distributor
is greatly diminished. Under first party no-fault insurance, deterrence is
not impaired because the insurance carrier can maintain the accident
victim's common law action against the product manufacturer. As discussed
previously, the common law system advances deterrence only imperfectly.
The worker compensation proposal would advance the policy of deterrence
less effectively than the common law because the action against the product manufacturer is limited to negligence. 3
Enterprise liability is better than the other proposals in this regard.
Professor O'Connell proposes a two-part test for determining whether to
impose liability under this system. The harm must have resulted from a
"typical risk" of the enterprise. 4 In addition, liability must also further
one of three goals: deterrence, improved resource allocation, or loss
spreading. 5 Fulfillment of the second part of this test guarantees that
liability will at least serve some purpose underlying strict liability. Of
course, it does not guarantee that the cost of fulfilling the objective is
justified in light of the burden on the manufacturer. Nevertheless, it is a
step in the right direction.
The other criteria for imposing liability under this proposal creates a
significant problem. The requirement that the harm be caused by a
"typical risk" of the enterprise is so nebulous that it is virtually devoid of
meaning." Rather than being analytically useful, the terminology merely
provides a vehicle for expressing a conclusion that has been intuitively
reached. Professor O'Connell concedes as much. 7 If anything, this scheme
would make the law of products liability more uncertain than it is today.
This is a serious drawback because the major criticism of the present
system is uncertainty. What is needed is a systematic way of analyzing
cases so that the policies underlying strict liability can be consistently
83

O'Connell, An Alternative to Abandoning Tort Liability: Elective No-fault Insurance

for Many Kinds of Injuries,60 MINN. L. REv. 501,550(1976).
84 O'Connell article, 59 VA. L. REV., supra note 3, at 772-73.
85 Id. at 777.
86

Malone, The Brave New World-A Review of "Negligence Without Fault," 25 So.

CALIF. L. REV. 14, 18-19 (1951).
87 O'Connell article, 59 VA. L. REV., supranote 3, at 820.
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advanced. A suggested method of doing this is discussed in the next section.
IV. FunctionallyImposed Strict Liability
A preferred approach is for the judge to decide as a matter of law
whether a given case is an appropriate one for strict liability. In making
this decision, he should systematically analyze all factors bearing on the
question of whether the policies of risk spreading and deterrence can be
advanced by the imposition of liability without unduly inhibiting industry
from continuing to supply useful products. This decision should be made
as a matter of law because it is a question of vital social importance, and
consistency from case to case is highly desirable. Thus, the court will
decide as a matter of law whether a given case is an appropriate one for
strict liability. Juries will be used to resolve disputed questions of fact such
as causation and damages. Because trial judges will be acting under the
ultimate supervision of a single appellate court, it will be possible over a
period of time to develop a jurisprudence which will make predictability of
result of future cases much easier than at present."
Courts presently use this approach to determine whether to impose
strict liability for abnormally dangerous activities.89 This theory closely
parallels strict liability in products cases because similar policy considerations form the basis for both actions. Consistency between the two areas is
desirable, and the approach used in the case of abnormally dangerous
activities is clearly the correct one. Judges rather than juries should decide
these important questions of policy so that these policy determinations are
consistently applied in similar cases.
An earlier article" suggested that the following list of factors be considered in determining whether to impose strict liability.
I. Risk Spreading
A. From the point of view of consumer.
1. Ability of consumer to bear loss.
88 Id. at 7117.

89 Chapman Chemical Co. v. Taylor, 215 Ark. 630, 222 S.W.2d 820 (1949); Luthringer v.
Moore, 31 Cal. 2d 489, 190 P.2d 1 (1948); Beck v. Bel Air Properties, 134 Cal. App. 2d 834, 286
P.2d 503 (1955); -Caporale v. C.W. Blakeslee & Sons, Inc., 149 Conn. 79, 175 A.2d 561 (1961);
Cities Serv. Co. v. State, 312 So. 2d 799 (Fla. App. 1975), noted in 4 FLA. STATE U. L. REV. 304,
310-11 (1976); Doundoulakis v. Town of Hempstead, 42 N.Y.2d 440, 398 N.Y.S.2d 401, 368
N.E.2d 24 (1977); Loe v. Lenhardt, 227 Ore. 242, 362 P.2d 312 (1961); Stroda v. State Highway
Comm'n, 22 Ore. App. 403, 539 P.2d 1147 (1975); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS, § 520, comment 1(1977); Montgomery & Owen, supra note 61, at 830; Wade, supra note 12, at 838.
90 Fischer, ProductsLiability- The Meaning of Defect, 39 Mo. L. REV. 339, 359 (1974).
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2. Feasibility and effectiveness of self-protective measures.
a. Knowledge of risk.
b. Ability to control danger.
c. Feasibility of deciding against use of product.
B. From point of view of manufacturer.
1. Knowledge of risk.
2. Accuracy of prediction of losses.
3. Size of losses.
4. Availability of insurance.
5. Ability of manufacturer to self-insure.
6. Effect of increased prices on industry.
7. Public necessity for the product.
8. Deterrent effect on the development of new products.
II. Safety Incentive
A. Likelihood of future product improvement.
B. Existence of additional precautions that can presently be taken.
C. Availability of safer substitutes.
In a given case these factors would be taken into account to determine
whether strict liability is desirable and feasible. If, on the whole, it is, the
judge will decide in favor of strict liability. Not all factors will consistently
point in the same direction, and the importance of a given factor may vary
from case to case. Thus, whether the danger is obvious or hidden, and
whether the risk is reasonable or unreasonable will often be relevant to the
decision, but these factors will seldom be controlling. This system can be
illustrated with a few examples.
Assume a consumer cuts himself with the sharp edge of a knife. The
judge will decide against imposing liability. The danger is known to the
consumer, and he can use the knife in such a way as to minimize the risk to
himself. Also, because the injury in many such cases is likely to be relatively
slight, the consumer is frequently able to bear the loss without undue hardship. On the other hand, risk spreading is not feasible from the point of
view of the manufacturer. It is unlikely that he could afford to pay
damages for every cut that is received from the blade of the knife. He clearly
would be unable to purchase reasonably priced insurance against such injuries. Moreover, liability does not serve as a safety incentive because it is
highly unlikely that technological advances could be made in the
foreseeable future that would permit the production of a knife that could
still be used as a knife and yet impose no danger of this sort of injury.
In the case of the punch press that was not equipped with a feasible
safety guard, strict liability would be imposed. Risk spreading is desirable
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because losses are likely to be too great for the victim to bear, and the
employee who is required to use the machine can do little to protect himself
from the danger of inadvertent injury. Operation of these machines
typically involves constant hurried repetition of the same movements for
hours at a time. The statistical likelihood of an inadvertent injury by
activating the machine before the worker's hand is clear is high. Strict
liability would provide a strong incentive to install the safety device
because this would be relatively inexpensive in comparison with potential
liability. The cost of installing such devices is not so great as to have an
adverse effect on the industry.
In the case of the newly developed antibiotic drug with the unknown
risk of an adverse side effect, the decision to impose strict liability depends
largely on the ability of the industry to spread the risk. If the damages are
greater than the industry can bear, the drug would be removed from the
market. This is undesirable if the product has high utility and there are no
safer substitutes. On the other hand, potential liability that can feasibly be
passed on in Ihe form of higher prices will provide an incentive to produce
a safer drug.
A great source of uncertainty in the present law of products liability is
that decisions have a retroactive effect. Under the proposed scheme this
would no longer be a problem. Courts could decide against retroactive application of a decision if this would have an adverse effect on industry. In
the punch press example, it might be feasible to require future models to be
equipped with a safety device, but it might not be feasible to require old
models that are currently in use to be modified at the manufacturer's expense. In this case the court could declare that the decision will have no
retroactive effect. Strict liability will apply only to the plaintiff's case and
to future cases where the injury resulted from use of a punch press made
without the safety device after the date of decision. Because the ability of
industry to bear the loss is taken into account, manufacturers would no
longer have reason to fear that they will unfairly be held liable for harm
resulting from the design of an old product because of subsequent
technological development.
This scheme would alleviate the concerns of manufacturers and products liability insurers. Predictability of result should be enhanced under
the system. Litigated cases will constitute useful precedent for resolving
similar future cases. Furthermore, because manufacturers know that their
interests are explicitly being taken into account by courts in deciding the
liability issue, justification for panic pricing of liability insurance is
eliminated. This is because one factor in determining whether to impose
liability will be the ability of the manufacturer to bear the loss.

HeinOnline -- 32 Okla. L. Rev. 116 1979

19791

STRICT LIABILITY

Conclusion
The current approach for determining defectiveness cannot consistently advance the policies underlying strict liability in a satisfactory
fashion in all cases. The factors underlying the feasibility and desirability
of imposing strict liability differ drastically from case to case. In adopting
various tests of defect, such as whether the product is unreasonably
dangerous or violates consumer expectations, courts have attempted to
resolve all such cases by use of a single, uniform criterion such as the
reasonableness of the danger or the obviousness of the danger. These matters may often be relevant to the question of whether strict liability is both
feasible and desirable. However, they are frequently not conclusive. In the
case of the punch press which is not equipped with a feasible safety device,
no valid policy is served by granting the manufacturer an immunity. Obviousness of the danger does not adequately protect the worker; strict
liability is financially feasible, and it will provide an incentive to market
safer products. In the case of the experimental drug with the unknowable
side effects, strict liability would further both the policy of risk spreading
and providing a safety incentive. The only reason for not imposing liability
is that it might not be financially feasible from the point of view of the
manufacturer. This consideration is unrelated to the question of whether
the risk involved is a reasonable risk or an unreasonable risk.
Using the two tests in combination rather than singly does not solve
this problem. This approach merely insures that most of the errors will be
made either in favor of the manufacturer or the consumer, depending on
which combination of the tests of defect is used. The conservative approach of combining the consumer expectations test and the unreasonable
danger test in the conjunctive narrows the scope of liability of the
manufacturer much more than either test alone would do. Thus, most of
the errors from a policy point of view will involve cases where liability was
not imposed even though it was feasible and desirable to do so. On the
other hand, the liberal courts, which combine the tests in the disjunctive,
have adopted a rule which imposes liability in many more cases than would
either rule alone. Thus, most policy errors made by such courts will be on
the side of the consumer. That is, strict liability was imposed even though it
failed to serve either the policy of risk spreading or deterrence, or it was
not economically feasible from the industry point of view to impose such
liability.
The tort experience with proximate cause issues illustrates the futility
of attempting to resolve very complex policy issues by the mechanical application of simplistic word formulas. Early in the history of the law of
negligence, courts attempted to find a single test that could be used in all
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cases. It soon became apparent that this was unworkable. For example,
foreseeability is sometimes used as the test of proximate cause. 9 However,
it is clear that in some cases foreseeability carries liability too far,92 and in
other cases it does not extend liability far enough.93 In order to resolve this
difficulty, courts have had either to abandon the attempt to find a single
rule,94 or to develop word formulas that are so ambiguous that they provide little guidance for resolving such cases, but are merely rationalizations
95
for the end result.
The same fate awaits the law of strict liability. Principles should be
forthrightly adopted for resolving cases in light of the policy considerations involved. Because these issues involve important questions of social
policy, and because consistency from case to case is important, these principles should be applied by judges rather than juries. This approach is
preferable to the alternative of adopting very flexible rules that can be easily manipulated to achieve desirable results. The latter scheme will create
the same appearance of uncertainty that is the basis of criticism of the present law of products liability.

91 E.g., Overseas Tankship (U.K,) Ltd. v. Morts Dock & Eng'rg Co., Ltd., (1961), A.C.
388 (Privy Council 1961.)
92 E.g., Petition of Kinsman Transit Co., 388 F.2d 821 (2d Cir. 1968).
93 E.g., Petition of Kinsman Transit Co., 338 F.2d 708 (2d Cir. 1964).
94 E.g., Petition of Kinsman Transit Co., 388 F.2d 821 (2d Cir. 1968).
95 E.g., Green v. Kahn, 391 S.W.2d 269 (Mo. 1965).
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